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This study investigated the cognitive processing of true
and false political information. Specifically, it examined
the impact of source credibility on the assessment of
veracity when information comes from a polarizing source
(Experiment 1), and effectiveness of explanations when they
come from one’s own political party or an opposition party
(Experiment 2). These experiments were conducted prior to
the 2016 Presidential election. Participants rated their belief in
factual and incorrect statements that President Trump made
on the campaign trail; facts were subsequently affirmed and
misinformation retracted. Participants then re-rated their belief
immediately or after a delay. Experiment 1 found that (i) if
information was attributed to Trump, Republican supporters
of Trump believed it more than if it was presented without
attribution, whereas the opposite was true for Democrats
and (ii) although Trump supporters reduced their belief in
misinformation items following a correction, they did not
change their voting preferences. Experiment 2 revealed that
the explanation’s source had relatively little impact, and belief
updating was more influenced by perceived credibility of the
individual initially purporting the information. These findings
suggest that people use political figures as a heuristic to guide
evaluation of what is true or false, yet do not necessarily insist
on veracity as a prerequisite for supporting political candidates.
2017 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted
use, provided the original author and source are credited.
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1. Introduction
Individuals from opposing sides of the political spectrum often disagree over what is fact and what is
fiction. While both conservatives and liberals aim to be well informed, even empirical information that
seems straightforward can lead to discord [1]. For example, people perceive unemployment, inflation
and crime rates to be lower when their preferred party is in power [2]. Partisanship clearly influences the
way people process information, but the exact cognitive mechanisms that underlie these differences are
still being debated [3–5]. In this study, we focus on source credibility. Individuals have limited time and
cognitive resources to comprehend complex topics such as policy or current affairs, and may therefore
use the perceived credibility of political figures as a heuristic to guide their evaluation of what is true or
false. For instance, Republicans and Democrats are likely to assess the veracity of a statement differently
depending on whether it comes from a favoured politician [6].
To study how individuals evaluate whether political information is true or false, we first examined
the impact of source credibility on the initial assessment of information veracity. To this end, we used
statements from perhaps the most polarizing political figure of recent times, President Trump. As these
experiments were conducted prior to his election and inauguration, we henceforth refer to the him as
‘Donald Trump’, or ‘Trump’. Second, we investigated the impact of source credibility on the corrective
effect of retracting misinformation and affirming factual statements.
1.1. The continued influence effect
False information continues to influence memory and reasoning even after credible corrections; this has
been termed the continued influence effect of misinformation [7–9]. Once information is assumed to be true,
this conviction is subsequently difficult to change. The continued influence effect occurs even with non-
politicized misinformation and at least in part reflects the inherent difficulty of updating one’s mental
model of an event or a causality [10,11]. However, ongoing reliance on corrected misinformation becomes
an even greater problem when the misinformation conforms to a person’s pre-existing belief and
supports their ideological worldviews, whereas the correction runs counter [12,13]. Once an individual
feels personally connected to information, their ideology and values influence how that information is
processed [14,15]; this is known as motivated reasoning or motivated cognition.
1.2. Motivated cognition
There is an extensive literature on motivated cognition that suggests individuals are more critical
when evaluating information that is counter to their beliefs than belief-congruent information, and
conclusions that people reach are likely to be consistent with their prior assumptions about how the
world functions [16–18]. For example, a classic study by Lord et al. [19] found that both supporters and
opposers of capital punishment rated studies regarding the death penalty as more convincing when
the studies confirmed their existing views. In addition, after receiving mixed evidence comprising both
supportive and critical findings, participants’ attitudes further diverged—those who initially opposed
the death penalty reported opposing it even more, and the reverse occurred for those in support of
the death penalty. This illustrates how an individual’s worldview can dictate how new information is
assessed, legitimizing the preservation of the person’s ideological belief system [20].
In the real world, information sometimes turns out to be incorrect and therefore may be subject
to revision. Once people have decided that they believe some particular information to be true, they
may encounter a correction that challenges their conviction. The extent to which people take heed
and change their beliefs based on such corrections may depend on motivated cognition. Specifically,
if a correction runs counter to a person’s beliefs and worldview, they may be more likely to ignore
it, and cling to the original misinformation. For example, when incorrect information arising from
a Democratic politician’s statement is retracted, Democrats—and particularly those who support the
politician—may resist the correction more than their Republican counterparts who have a vested interest
in the political figure being incorrect. At worst, a potential outcome of the attempt to correct contentious
misinformation is a worldview backfire effect. This occurs when an individual feels motivated to defend
their belief system, and ironically reports a stronger belief in the original misconception after receiving
a retraction. For example, worldview backfire effects have been documented with attempts to promote
vaccine safety [21], as well as attempts to correct misconceptions regarding anthropogenic climate change
or the existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq immediately prior to the invasion of
2003 [22,23].
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This phenomenon might be especially pronounced among certain individuals. A recent debate in the
literature is concerned with the question of whether conservatives are generally more prone to motivated
cognition and worldview backfire effects. One school of thought assumes that personality characteristics
associated with conservative ideology present a specific susceptibility for motivated cognition. For
example, Jost et al. [24] suggested that psychological variables such as dogmatism (that is, intolerance of
ambiguity, avoidance of complexity and a need for closure) are predictive of conservatism and increase
the likelihood that an individual engages in ‘black-or-white’ assessments of information. This tendency
to readily decide on information veracity with subsequent resistance to change could lead to greater
rejection of factual information for those on the political right relative to moderate and liberal segments
of the population [25].
By contrast, Kahan [4] posits that identity-protective motivated cognition occurs equally at both ends
of the political spectrum, arguing that conservatives and liberals perform comparably on a measure
of information-processing dispositions associated with cognitive biases. Individuals who scored higher
on ‘cognitive reflection’—a disposition to engage in effortful processing [26]—were more likely to
demonstrate motivated cognition, regardless of partisanship. While the rejection of scientific evidence
seems to be primarily associated with conservative ideology [27], the observed asymmetry may not
reflect fundamental differences in cognition; rather, it may just be the case that the contested scientific
findings happen to challenge primarily the worldview of conservatives rather than liberals [28]. In
support of this, Nisbet et al. [29] found that liberal participants react in a manner equivalent to
conservatives if they encounter liberal-dissonant science messages, for example regarding the efficacy
of nuclear power.
In contrast to these backfire effects, Kahan [30] reported no partisan difference for scientific rejection
among issues that do not challenge worldviews, such as cell-phone radiation or exposure to high-voltage
powerlines. Additionally, Kuklinski et al. [31] found that while strong partisans held the least accurate
beliefs regarding welfare policy (e.g. the proportion of the federal budget that welfare absorbs), and
the highest confidence that these beliefs were accurate, they were not more inclined to reject factual
information once corrections were presented. It is therefore possible that party-line differences in the
willingness to engage in belief revision are not as pervasive as some research has suggested; there is
some evidence that if strong partisans receive quality information, they may be able to interpret it in a
similar fashion and update their beliefs to the same extent ([32]; see also [33]).
1.3. Source credibility
In addition to motivated reasoning, when people are evaluating whether information is fact or fiction,
the source of the information matters a great deal. In general, high-credibility sources are more
persuasive and promote greater attitude change than low credibility sources [34]. Additionally, given
that attitude homophily—i.e. the extent to which a person perceives similarities between the way
they think and another person does—is a key determinant of perceived source credibility, candidate
support has substantial impact when estimating the credibility of preferred versus non-preferred political
candidates [6]. Two key components of source credibility are (i) expertise—the extent to which the source
is able to give accurate information—and (ii) trustworthiness—the extent to which the source is willing to
provide information that the source itself assumes to be correct [35].
When it comes to the efficacy of correcting inaccurate information, it appears that the latter is more
important than the former—it is more important that the source of the correction is perceived to be
trustworthy than having expertise (U. K. H. Ecker, L. Antonio 2016, unpublished data) [36,37]. This
finding suggests that the most effective way to reduce misconceptions is to attribute the correction to
a source that the person finds a trustworthy source of information, such as a member of the political
party the individual identifies with. On the other hand, there is contrasting evidence suggesting that
an unlikely source—for example, a Republican correcting another Republican—could be more effective
at reducing misconceptions than a source that is expected to provide the corrective information.
Thus, a Democrat’s belief in misinformation originating from a Republican source may be more
strongly reduced by a correction that also comes from a Republican source, rather than a Democrat
source [3].
Even if people are able to change their beliefs immediately after a correction, belief change may be
fleeting (B. Swire, U. K. H. Ecker, S. Lewandowsky 2016, unpublished data). In this case, worldview
and an individual’s trust in the veracity of the source may influence the rate of forgetting, and could
thus lead to ‘motivated forgetting’ [38]. For example, if misinformation arising from a Democratic
politician’s statement is retracted, Democrats who support the politician may initially update their belief,
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but conveniently forget the correction at an accelerated pace over time, thus eventually reverting to their
pre-existing beliefs.
Finally, even if it is possible to correct people’s misconceptions, it is unclear whether or not such
corrections affect candidate support. If an individual acknowledges that a number of a politician’s
statements are untrue, they should reduce their support to the extent that truthfulness is a desirable
trait of a political figure. However, Redlawsk [39] found that participants increased their support
for candidates whom they endorsed when provided with negative information about the candidate.
Likewise, Meffert et al. [40] found that participants spent more time reading negative stories about
candidates they preferred, yet this led to a more positive outlook of the candidate. This shows that
candidate support ratings are also subject to worldview backfire effects, and it is therefore possible that
highlighting misinformation that candidates have disseminated may not result in any loss in support,
and could ironically lead to increased support.
1.4. The case of Donald Trump
It is clear that individuals view the world through a partisan filter; however, the extent to which
citizens use partisan cues such as political figures to evaluate the veracity of information and corrections
requires further exploration. Donald Trump is an interesting case study for misinformation research,
as bipartisan fact-checking media outlets have found that Donald Trump has been particularly prone
to inaccuracies [41,42], and for much of the presidential campaign was a divisive figure even among
Republicans [43].
While voters are well aware that they encounter politically motivated misinformation during election
campaigns, they find it difficult to pinpoint the accuracy of specific messages and are therefore
misinformed on a wide array of prominent issues [44]. Donald Trump’s popularity, despite the amount
of misinformation he distributed, can be explained by either the notion that (i) people believe that his
assertions are true (partially because they see Donald Trump as a trustworthy source of information) and
they avoid or resist the many corrections available in the public sphere (partially based on motivated
cognition), or alternatively (ii) the public is aware that Donald Trump is spreading misinformation, but
does not insist on veracity as a prerequisite for their support of a candidate. In this study, we explored
these possibilities through several means. First, we tested whether the public believes misinformation
spread by a polarizing source, and whether such information can be effectively corrected. We also
explored whether a change in belief leads to a shift in voting preferences (i.e. after a credible correction,
did people reduce their belief in misinformation yet continued to support Donald Trump?).
Specifically, Experiment 1 investigated (i) whether belief in both misinformation and factual
information differs depending on whether or not the information is associated with a polarizing source
(i.e. Donald Trump); (ii) whether the impact of corrections/affirmations differs when support for the
polarizing source of the original information is taken into account; and (iii) whether belief change is
sustained over time. Experiment 2 tested whether the impact of corrective/affirmative explanations
is moderated by partisanship (i.e. stating that a correction/affirmation stems from a Democratic,
Republican or non-partisan source).
2. Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was conducted in November 2015 prior to the Iowa caucus, when 13 other candidates
apart from Donald Trump were still viable options (these candidates were Jeb Bush, Ben Carson, Chris
Christie, Ted Cruz, Carly Fiorina, Jim Gilmore, Lindsay Graham, Mike Huckabee, John Kasich, George
Pataki, Rand Paul, Marco Rubio and Rick Santorum). The experiment featured actual statements made
by Donald Trump on the campaign trail in 2015. Some of these statements were inaccurate and others
were factual. When these statements were presented to participants, they were either explicitly attributed
to Trump or presented without attribution. The objectively false statements were then corrected, and the
true statements were affirmed, with a brief explanation. Participants rated their belief in the statements
both before and after the corrective/affirmative explanation; the second rating was either immediate or
following a one-week delay.
To tease apart partisanship from candidate advocacy, we separated Republican participants into those
who supported Trump and those who did not. This step is somewhat rare in studies of political cognition,
but given the polarizing nature of Trump’s candidacy within the Republican party at the time of the
study, we felt it was inappropriate to mix these two groups. The study thus used a 2× 2× 2× 3 design—
type of item (misinformation versus fact) was a within-subjects factor, and the between-subjects factors
 on April 4, 2017http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
5rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.4:160802
................................................
Trump support
Democrats
unattributed facts/
misinformation
affirmations/
corrections
immediate post-test
delayed post-test
immediate post-test
delayed post-test
delayed post-test
delayed post-test
delayed post-test
delayed post-test
immediate post-test
immediate post-test
immediate post-test
immediate post-test
affirmations/
corrections
affirmations/
corrections
affirmations/
corrections
affirmations/
corrections
affirmations/
corrections
Trump facts/
misinformation
unattributed facts/
misinformation
unattributed facts/
misinformation
Trump facts/
misinformation
Trump facts/
misinformation
Republican
supporters
Republican
non-supporters
pre-explanation ratings
(randomized)
explanations
(randomized)
time
post-explanation ratings
(randomized)
Figure 1. Design schematic of Experiment 1.
were the source of information (Trump versus unattributed), study-test retention interval (immediate
versus delayed) and Trump support (Democrat versus Republican non-supporters versus Republican
supporters). See figure 1 for a schematic diagram of the experimental design. Our prime dependent
variable was participants’ belief in the inaccurate and factual statements measured on an 11-point scale,
as well as participants’ self-reported support for Donald Trump.
We hypothesized that participants would use Donald Trump as a cue to evaluate information veracity:
we expected that Republican Trump supporters would increase belief in both misinformation and factual
statements if they were attributed to Donald Trump, and Democrats and Republican non-supporters
would decrease their belief. We also hypothesized that explanations would have a limited effect and
would be less sustained over time when they ran counter to participants’ expectations arising from
their affiliation (i.e. when Republican supporters encountered corrections of Trump’s misinformation or
Democrats and Republican non-supporters encountered affirmations of Trump’s true statements). Lastly,
we hypothesized that voting preferences would increase or not change, even if participants reduced
belief in misinformation (or increased belief in facts) attributed to Trump.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Participants were 2023 US residents recruited through Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk. Republican
participants who had recently taken part in previous studies from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology’s Political Experiments Research Laboratory were invited to participate. We adopted this
oversampling strategy due to the relative scarcity of Republicans within the Mechanical Turk population.
Participants were paid 85 cents and an additional 50 cents in the one-week delayed condition. They were
excluded from the analysis if they did not complete all parts of the study (n= 247).1 The final sample
included N= 1776 participants, with 884 males and 892 females in the age range of 19–78 years, with a
mean age of M= 35.73 (s.d.= 11.41).
2.1.2. Stimuli
Four inaccurate statements and four factual statements made by Donald Trump on the campaign trail
prior to 1 October 2015 were compiled by the authors. The Trump condition explicitly stated that
1Of the excluded participants, 94% were in the one-week retention interval. A Pearson χ2-test indicated that neither Trump support,
χ2 = (3, N= 2023)= 1.92, p= 0.589, nor source, χ2 = (1, N= 2023)= 0.28, p= 0.592, differed between participants who were included
and those who were excluded.
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Table 1. Examples of Trump and unattributed misinformation with corresponding corrections.
misinformation correction
Trump Donald Trump said that vaccines cause autism. Donald Trump said that vaccines cause autism.
On a scale between 0 and 10, do you believe
Trump’s statement to be true?
This is false.
There is strong consensus in the scientific community that
vaccines are not linked to autism. For example, one study by
the Danish Epidemiology Science Centre tracked all children
born in Denmark from 1991 to 1998 and concluded that
there was no increase in the rate of autism for vaccinated as
opposed to non-vaccinated children.
You previously rated this statement x out of 10 (0= definitely
false, 10= definitely true)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
unattributed Vaccines cause autism. Vaccines cause autism.
On a scale between 0 and 10, do you believe
this statement to be true?
This is false.
There is strong consensus in the scientific community that
vaccines are not linked to autism. For example, one study by
the Danish Epidemiology Science Centre tracked all children
born in Denmark from 1991 to 1998 and concluded that
there was no increase in the rate of autism for vaccinated as
opposed to non-vaccinated children.
You previously rated this statement x out of 10 (0= definitely
false, 10= definitely true).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Donald Trump was the propagator of the information, while the unattributed condition presented the
information without specifying its source. Corrections and affirmations of equal length (i.e. two to three
sentences) were created; each explanation explicitly referenced a reputable source. Sources were chosen
to be non-partisan (e.g. the ‘Danish Epidemiology Science Centre’ or the ‘US Bureau of Labor Statistics’).
An example misinformation item with its corresponding correction can be found in table 1 (see appendix
A for the complete list of items). Explanations consisted of four segments: (i) the participant was
reminded of the initial item; (ii) the veracity was presented; (iii) information was given as to why the
statement was true or false and (iv) the participant was given a reminder of their initial belief rating.
2.1.3. Procedure
After reviewing a University of Western Australia and Massachusetts Institute of Technology approved
consent form, participants took the survey through Qualtrics.com. They were first presented with general
demographic and political-ideology questions. Participants who did not identify with a party, but
indicated that they leaned towards a particular party were classified as partisans [45]. This was followed
by questions regarding the likelihood of voting for candidates in the 2016 Presidential campaign. The
candidates were Donald Trump, Ben Carson, Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders, who were the front-
runners at the time the survey was conducted. Participants’ feelings towards the candidates were also
measured using the ‘candidate-feelings thermometers’ employed in the American National Elections
Study. These entail asking participants to rate how favourably and warm they feel towards the person;
ratings between 0 and 50 degrees are taken to indicate they do not feel particularly warm, and ratings
between 50 and 100 are taken to indicate they do feel favourably and warm towards the candidate.
Participants were presented with the eight statements in a randomized order; participants received
either all statements attributed to Donald Trump or alternatively presented without source specification.
After rating the extent to which they believed each item on a 0–10 scale, participants received an
explanation for each item as to whether it was true or false.2 Participants then moved directly to the
test phase if they were in the immediate post-test group. This involved re-rating belief in all eight
2As all items were presented within-subjects, it could be a concern that participants receiving multiple pieces of corrective information
are more vulnerable to social desirability biases. However, a one-way ANOVA on the pre-explanation belief ratings confirmed that
their presentation order did not have a significant influence on belief, F7,12425 = 1.38; p= 0.210. Post-explanation belief was likewise not
affected by presentation order, F7,12425 = 1.61; p= 0.127.
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Figure 2. (a,b) Pre-explanation Democratic and Republican belief in statements associated with Trump or presented unattributed. Error
bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
statements in random order, as well as re-rating candidate support and feelings towards the candidates.
In the delayed post-test condition, participants were instead re-contacted after one week and given the
opportunity to complete the test phase.
2.2. Results
Of the 1776 participants, 1015 identified as Democrats and 535 identified as Republicans. The 226
participants who had no political affiliation were omitted from the following analyses. Of the
Republicans, 323 were classified as Trump supporters as they scored 5 or more (out of 10) on
the likelihood to vote for Trump measure, and the 212 participants who scored less than 5 were
classified Trump non-supporters. There were 99 Democrats who supported Trump—all main effects
and interactions of the following analyses were replicated if these participants were omitted from
the analyses.
First, Trump support groups were compared on demographic measures. A one-way ANOVA
indicated that age was different between groups, F2,1547= 26.03; p< 0.001; MSE= 128; η2p = 0.03.
Democrats are younger than both Republican groups, F1,1547= 46.82; p< 0.001; MSE= 128. Next, a
one-way ANOVA indicated that education was different between groups, F2,1547= 12.29; p< 0.001;
MSE= 1.48; η2p = 0.01. Planned comparisons revealed that Republican non-supporters were significantly
more educated than Democrats, F1,1547= 4.51; p= 0.034; MSE= 1.48, yet Democrats were significantly
more educated than Trump supporters, F1,1547= 8.82; p= 0.003; MSE= 1.48. Finally, a Pearson χ2 test
revealed there were no gender differences between groups, χ2= (3, N= 1776)= 2.24, p= 0.489. The
following analyses remained statistically significant when controlling for education and age using
factorial ANCOVAs (unless indicated otherwise).
2.2.1. Pre-explanation belief scores
Pre-explanation belief scores partitioned by Trump support are shown in figure 2. Figure 2a shows
the misinformation, and b shows the facts. We further split the sample into those respondents who
received statements without source attribution and those who received statements attributed to Trump.
For both misinformation and factual statements, Trump attribution was associated with lower belief in
the statements among Democrats and greater belief among Republican supporters of Trump. Among
Republican non-supporters, a Trump attribution did not affect belief in the misinformation, but did
reduce belief in factual statements.
A 2× 3 factorial ANOVA was performed on the misinformation pre-explanation belief scores. The
analysis revealed two significant main effects. The main effect of type of source (unattributed versus
Trump), F1,1544= 6.12; p= 0.013; MSE= 2.60; η2p = 0.004, indicated that Trump attribution influenced
belief. The main effect of Trump support (Democrats versus Republican non-supporters versus
Republican supporters), F2,1544= 116.94; p< 0.001; MSE= 2.60; η2p = 0.13, indicated that beliefs of the
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Figure 3. (a,b) Belief in Trump and unattributedmisinformation and facts over time, across Trump support groups and source conditions.
Rep, Republican; misinfo, misinformation. Dotted lines showmisinformation items. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
three groups differed. These main effects were qualified by an interaction between source and
Trump support, F2,1544= 28.84; p< 0.001; MSE= 2.60; η2p = 0.04, reflecting that Trump attribution led
to decreased belief for Democrats but increased belief for Trump supporters. Additionally, a planned
comparison confirmed that, for Republican non-supporters, misinformation belief was not affected
by Trump attribution, p= 0.575.
Next, we performed a 2× 3 factorial ANOVA on the pre-explanation belief scores for the factual
statements. The analysis revealed main effects of both type of source, F1,1544= 15.96; p< 0.001;
MSE= 2.25; η2p = 0.01, and Trump support, F2,1544= 34.50; p< 0.001; MSE= 2.25; η2p = 0.04, as well as an
interaction of source and Trump support, F2,1544= 25.50; p< 0.001; MSE= 2.25; η2p = 0.03. An interaction
contrast confirmed that for factual statements, Republican non-supporters believed in the facts less when
the information was associated with Trump rather than unattributed, whereas the Republican supporters
expressed greater belief in statements made by Trump, F1,1544= 8.03; p= 0.005; MSE= 2.25. A planned
comparison revealed that Democrats believed the statements less if attributed to Trump, F1,1544= 119.61;
p< 0.001; MSE= 2.25. Thus, Trump support influenced the perceived truth of the information.
2.2.2. Post-explanation belief scores
The general trend and the full trajectory of belief change over time are shown in figure 3. Figure 3a
shows the unattributed condition, and b shows the Trump-attributed condition. Immediately after
the corrections/affirmations, both Democrats and Republicans showed a substantial amount of belief
change, which generally diminished over the course of one week for both misinformation and facts.
We found no evidence for backfire effects, as post-explanation belief scores in misinformation remained
below pre-explanation levels.
To simplify the data, we computed total accuracy scores by subtracting participants’ misinformation
scores from their fact scores. On this measure, the higher the score, the more likely participants were
to accurately assume misinformation to be false and factual information to be true. These accuracy
scores across conditions are shown in figure 4. A 2× 2× 3 factorial ANOVA involving the source,
retention interval and Trump support factors was performed on the post-correction accuracy scores.
The analysis revealed three significant main effects. The main effect of source, F1,1538= 15.42; p< 0.001;
MSE= 6.93; η2p = 0.01, indicated that Trump attribution was associated with less accurate post-correction
beliefs. The main effect of retention interval, F1,1538= 183.44; p< 0.001; MSE= 6.93; η2p = 0.11, indicated
that belief accuracy dropped over the course of a week, and the main effect of Trump support,
F2,1538= 9.34; p< 0.001; MSE= 6.93; η2p = 0.01, indicated that belief accuracy differed by Trump support,
with Republican Trump supporters showing the lowest scores overall.
These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction of source and retention interval,
F1,1538= 3.94; p= 0.047; MSE= 6.93; η2p = 0.003, indicating that the influence of Trump attribution
changed over time.3 From figure 4, we can see that in the immediate condition, Trump attribution does
not have a strong influence; over the course of a week, however, participants from all groups seemed to
3This interaction was only marginally significant when controlling for age, p= 0.060.
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Figure 4. (a,b) Accuracy scores—misinformation scores subtracted from fact scores—across Trump support and source. Error bars
denote 95% confidence intervals.
forget the corrective/affirmative explanations at an accelerated rate when the original information was
associated with Donald Trump. This was confirmed with a significant planned comparison that focused
on the one-week delayed condition that contrasted the Trump-attributed against unattributed condition,
and was collapsed over Trump support, F1,1538= 15.13; p< 0.001; MSE= 6.93. In other words, if the
original information came from Donald Trump, after a one-week delay participants had less accurate
beliefs, regardless of their affiliation or initial support for Trump.
If the post-explanation misinformation and items are analysed separately, we see similar trends
(the full analyses can be found in appendix B). The most prominent differences to the above accuracy
score analyses are that (i) misinformation items do not show an interaction of source and retention
interval, indicating that unlike the fact scores (where Trump attribution led to less accurate beliefs
particularly over time), Trump attribution led to a less accurate belief over both time periods and (ii) fact
items additionally show an interaction of Trump support and retention interval, F2,1538= 3.44; p= 0.032;
MSE= 2.38; η2p = 0.004. While Democrats over both time periods are worse at updating their belief in the
facts if information is attributed to Trump, Republicans immediately update their belief equally in the
Trump and unattributed conditions, yet after one week their belief in the Trump-attributed information
is less than their belief in the unattributed condition, F1,1538= 5.08; p= 0.0243; MSE= 2.38.
To illustrate why accuracy is reduced after one week due to Trump attribution, figure 5 shows the
Trump condition subtracted from the unattributed condition—observations above zero indicate that the
attribution of a statement to Trump encourages participants to believe the information; values below
zero indicate that the attribution of statements to Trump made participants less likely to believe in
the information. Figure 5a shows the misinformation, and b shows the facts. The distance from zero
indicates the impact that the Trump attribution is having upon the belief scores. Figure 5 highlights the
fact that initially, before they receive the correction, participants use their support for Donald Trump
as a heuristic for whether information is true or false (i.e. independent of actual veracity, Republican
supporters believe Trump information more, Democrats believe Trump information less, and Republican
non-supporters are not affected much). However, after one week—regardless of partisanship and level
of Trump support—people tend to assume Trump’s facts are incorrect, and Trump’s misinformation is
accurate.
2.2.3. Likelihood-to-vote and feelings-thermometer ratings
Attributing the information to Trump did not influence participants’ intention to vote nor their feelings
towards the political figure. Figure 6 shows the full trajectory of participants’ likelihood to vote for
Donald Trump, both prior to and after the corrective/affirmative explanations. To simplify the analysis,
the post-explanation scores were subtracted from the pre-explanation scores to create change indices
for both the likelihood-to-vote and feelings-thermometer ratings.
A 2× 2× 3 factorial ANOVA on the likelihood-to-vote change index revealed two main effects. The
main effect of Trump support, F2,1537= 13.39; p< 0.001; MSE= 1.35; η2p = 0.02, indicated that Republicans
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Figure 5. (a,b) Influence of Trump—Trump-attributed scores subtracted from unattributed scores— across Trump support. Misinfo,
misinformation; Rep, Republican. Dotted lines showmisinformation items.
were more likely to change their voting preferences than were Democrats. For example, Republican non-
supporters increased their support for Trump by 0.22 on the 10-point scale in the immediate condition
and by 0.35 after one week, yet Democrats only increased their support by 0.07 in the immediate
condition, and decreased their support by 0.01 after one week. The main effect of retention interval,
F1,1538= 8.00; p= 0.005; MSE= 1.35; η2p = 0.005, indicated that change was greater after one week than
immediately after the explanations.
These main effects were qualified by an interaction of retention interval and Trump support,
F2,1537= 9.06 p< 0.001; MSE= 1.35; η2p = 0.01, indicating that change in voting preferences differed
between Trump support groups over time. Republican supporters slightly reduced their likelihood of
voting for Trump and Republican non-supporters slightly increased their likelihood. As there was no
main effect or interaction of source, it can be assumed that these differences can be attributed to natural
fluctuation of voting preferences over time rather than the explicit association of information to Donald
Trump. The likelihood-to-vote trend was mimicked by the feelings-thermometer ratings (see appendix
C for the figure and analysis).
Finally, 48 pairwise correlations were calculated for Democrats, Republican supporters and
Republican non-supporters to investigate whether belief change in misinformation or factual statements
was associated with (i) a change in likelihood to vote or (ii) feelings towards Trump over time for each
retention interval and source. Using a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level of 0.001, two correlations were
significant, revealing that the more Democrats reduced their belief in Trump-attributed misinformation,
the more they reduced their feelings and likelihood of voting for Trump one week post-explanation
(r= 0.36 and r= 0.33, respectively). This could reflect the fact that Democrats who reduce misconceptions
attributed to Trump view him less favourably after one week, or alternatively, that those who do not
like Trump report that they believe him less after one week. The absence of significant correlations for
the remaining Democratic and Republican groups indicated that their intentions to vote and feelings
towards Trump were independent of belief change.
2.3. Discussion
Experiment 1 revealed several notable findings. First, when initially evaluating the veracity of both
misinformation and factual statements, Republican supporters of Trump believed the information more
when it was attributed to Trump, whereas the opposite occurred for Democrats. Republicans who did
not support Trump also believed less in facts associated with Trump (but not to the same extent as
Democrats), while their belief in the misinformation was not affected by information source. Overall, the
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Figure 6. Likelihood-to-vote ratings over time between Trump support and source. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
Rep, Republican; Misinfo, misinformation.
Trump attribution did indeed colour people’s assessment of information veracity, dictating how valid
they perceived it to be.
Second, there was a large bipartisan shift in belief post-explanation, indicating that all members of the
political spectrum are capable of substantial belief change when sound non-partisan explanations are
presented. However, after a one-week delay, participants partially ‘re-believed’ in the misinformation
and partially forgot that factual information was true. Thus, even if individuals update their beliefs
temporarily, explanations regarding both fact and fiction seemingly have an expiration date (cf. B. Swire,
U. K. H. Ecker, S. Lewandowsky 2016, unpublished data). People revert to their original assumptions,
highlighting that once inaccurate information is in the public sphere, it is difficult to permanently correct,
and reservations regarding factual information are likewise challenging to permanently overcome.
From the pre-explanation belief scores, we know that Republican Trump supporters were predisposed
to assume that information attributed to Trump was correct, regardless of its actual veracity. One
week after the explanations, this bias continued for the misinformation items, but for factual items
participants became less likely to think that Trump’s statements were true. Similarly, Democrats—who
are predisposed to assume that information attributed to Trump is incorrect—continued to exhibit
bias for factual items, but were more likely to think Trump’s misinformation was true. It thus seems
as if participants on both sides of the spectrum took into account their Trump-related biases but
overcorrected for them: Republican supporters overcorrected by assuming that Trump’s facts were false,
and Democrats overcorrected by assuming that Trump’s misinformation was true.
Third, Republican Trump supporters showed the highest level of post-explanation belief in
misinformation in both Trump and unattributed conditions. This may reflect that only so much belief
revision is possible (as their pre-explanation misinformation belief was also at a higher level), or
alternatively that Republican Trump supporters were less inclined to believe our corrections.
Fourth, it was noteworthy that if the original information came from Donald Trump, after an
explanation participants were less able to accurately label what was fact or fiction in comparison to
the unattributed condition, regardless of their support for Trump. This was particularly the case for fact
items after a delay, where even the Republican groups were less likely to think that the true information
was indeed accurate if attributed to Trump.
Finally, while Republican supporters did update their beliefs when presented with corrections of
misinformation, they did not change their voting intentions nor feelings towards Trump when the
misinformation was attributed to the political figure. The degree that Republican supporters updated
their belief that Trump’s misinformation was false was not significantly correlated with a change in
voting intentions nor feelings towards Trump. This suggests that the public, or at least Trump supporters,
are not overly concerned with a candidate disseminating misinformation and seem to be looking to
qualities other than veracity.
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Figure 7. Design schematic of Experiment 2.
To test how processing of corrective/affirmative explanations is moderated by explanation source,
we ran Experiment 2.
3. Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was conducted in July 2016. As in Experiment 1, participants were presented with
inaccurate statements and factual statements that Donald Trump mentioned on the campaign trail in
2015, and the objectively false statements were corrected and the true statements affirmed. However,
unlike Experiment 1, all statements were attributed to Trump. The other predominant difference between
the two experiments was that we varied the nature of the explanations regarding the veracity of the
information. In Experiment 2, the same explanations came from different partisan sources. Specifically,
we randomized the attribution of the explanation to follow one of three forms: (i) ‘According to
Democrats’, (ii) ‘According to Republicans’ or (iii) ‘According to a non-partisan fact-checking website’.
Participants rated their belief in the statements both before and immediately after the explanation
(though not one week later). The study thus used a 2× 3× 3 design, with the within-subjects factors type
of item (misinformation versus fact) and explanation source (Democrat versus Republican versus non-
partisan), and a between-subjects factor of Trump support (Democrat versus Republican non-supporters
versus Republican supporters). See figure 7 for a schematic of this design. Our prime dependent variables
were participants’ belief in the statements, as well as participants’ self-reported support for Donald
Trump.
Two potential outcomes were that (i) partisanship-congruent explanations would be more effective
than partisanship-incongruent explanations due to greater support and trust in the source (e.g.
Democrats being more influenced by a Democratic explanation) (U. K. H. Ecker, L. Antonio 2016,
unpublished data) [36,37] or (ii) a Democratic source would be more effective for all participants at
affirming Trump’s factual statements, and a Republican correction would be more effective at retracting
Trump’s misinformation, due to the surprise of an unlikely source presenting the explanation [3].
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Participants were 1019 US residents recruited through Survey Sampling International of Shelton,
Connecticut. An over-18 population was recruited, targeting the census population for education, gender,
age, geography and income, resulting in a diverse national sample. Participants were excluded from the
analysis if they did not complete all parts of the study (n= 59).4 The final sample included N= 960
4A Pearson χ2-test indicated that there was no difference in Trump support between participants who were included and those who
were excluded, X2 = (3, N= 983)= 5.42, p= 0.144.
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Figure 8. Pre-explanation Democratic and Republican belief in statements associated with Trump. Error bars denote 95% confidence
intervals.
participants, with 456 males and 504 females. The age range was 19–86 years with a mean age of
M= 41.89 (s.d.= 17.96).
3.1.2. Stimuli
As stimuli, we used six of the eight statements from Experiment 1: three inaccurate statements and
three factual statements. The corrective/affirmative explanations were pseudo-randomly determined.
Specifically, each item was attributed to one of the three different explanation sources (Republican,
Democrat and non-partisan) in a counterbalanced manner, but we ensured that participants received all
explanation sources during the experiment. This resulted in each participant seeing each of the respective
explanation sources for one misinformation and one factual statement.
3.1.3. Procedure
Participants first rated their likelihood to vote for Donald Trump, and were then presented with all six
statements in a randomized order. Participants rated the extent to which they believed each item to be
true on a 0–10 scale, prior to receiving an explanation for each item as to whether it was true or false
(with explanations coming from the three different sources). The test phase involved re-rating belief in
all six statements in random order as well as re-rating Trump support immediately after all explanations
were presented.
3.2. Results
Of the 960 participants, 514 identified as Democrats. Of the 286 Republicans, 186 were Trump supporters
and 100 were Trump non-supporters. The 160 participants who had no political affiliation were omitted
from the following analyses. There were 81 Democrats who supported Trump—all main effects and
interactions of the following analyses were replicated if they were omitted from the analyses. A one-
way ANOVA revealed there was a main effect of age, F2,797= 4.88; p= 0.008; MSE= 328.70; η2p = 0.01,
reflecting the fact that Republican non-supporters were younger than Republican supporters and
Democrats. The following analyses remained statistically significant when controlling for age using
repeated measures general linear models. There were no gender differences between groups (p= 0.121),
nor education differences (p= 0.346).
3.2.1. Pre-explanation belief scores
Pre-explanation belief scores by Trump support are shown in figure 8. In a clear replication of
Experiment 1, the Trump attribution led all participants to support the information to the extent that
they supported Trump.
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Figure 9. (a–c) Belief in Trumpmisinformation and facts after partisan explanations. Rep, Republican; Misinfo, misinformation. Dotted
lines showmisinformation items. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
A 2× 3 repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the pre-explanation belief scores. The
analysis revealed two significant main effects. The main effect of type of item (misinformation versus
fact), F1,797= 322.37 p< 0.001; MSE= 2.13; η2p = 0.29, indicated that misinformation was believed less
than facts. The main effect of Trump support (Democrats versus Republican non-supporters versus
Republican supporters), F2,797= 114.49; p< 0.001; MSE= 8.27; η2p = 0.22, indicated that pre-explanation
belief scores differed by Trump support. Republican supporters clearly believed Trump statements more
than the other two groups; a planned comparison also indicated that Republican non-supporters believed
the information more than Democrats, F1,797= 6.40; p= 0.012; MSE= 8.27.
3.2.2. Post-explanation belief scores
The general trend and the full trajectory of pre- and post-explanation belief change over time are shown
in figure 9. Immediately after the corrections/affirmations, both Democrats and Republicans showed a
substantial amount of belief change—belief in misinformation reduced and belief in factual information
increased. Partisanship and Trump support were far better predictors of the extent of belief updating
than the explanation source.
A 3× 3 repeated measures ANOVA involving explanation source (Democrat versus Republican
versus non-partisan) and Trump support (Democrat versus Republican supporter versus Republican
non-supporters) was performed on the post-explanation misinformation belief scores. The analysis
revealed a main effect of Trump support, F2,797= 19.15; p< 0.001; MSE= 20.72; η2p = 0.05, indicating
that groups differed in their belief, with Republican supporters believing in the misinformation more
than Republican non-supporters and Democrats. There was also a main effect of explanation source,
F2,1594= 6.01; p= 0.003; MSE= 4.81; η2p = 0.007, showing that a Republican correction reduced belief to a
greater extent than the Democratic or non-partisan corrections. However, it must be noted that this is a
small effect size and should be interpreted with caution.
To explore the observed trend that post-correction misinformation belief seemed to depend on
the correction source in Republican non-supporters more so than in Democrats and Republican
supporters, we ran an interaction contrast. Contrasting Republican non-supporters against the pooled
Democrats and Republican supporters, and the Republican correction against the pooled Democrat
and non-partisan corrections, revealed a significant effect, F1,797= 4.79; p= 0.029; MSE= 4.68. It appears
that misinformation belief was lowest after a Republican correction (versus Democrat/non-partisan
correction) in Republican non-supporters, F1,797= 9.69; p= 0.002, whereas there were no effects of
correction source on post-correction misinformation belief in Democrats or Republican supporters (all
F1,797 < 1.27; p> 0.257). However, as these were post hoc analyses of a marginal effect, they too should
be interpreted cautiously.
A 3× 3 mixed ANOVA restricted to the post-affirmation fact belief scores revealed a main effect of
Trump support, F2,797= 19.96; p< 0.001; MSE= 12.70; η2p = 0.05, indicating that Republican supporters
were more accurate for fact belief than Republican non-supporters and Democrats.
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Figure 10. Likelihood of voting for Trump across Trump support groups. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
3.2.3. Likelihood to vote
Figure 10 shows the full trajectory of participants’ likelihood to vote for Donald Trump, both prior to and
after the corrective/affirmative explanation. Explanations regarding Trump statements did not greatly
influence participants’ intention to vote. As in Experiment 1, to simplify the analysis, post-explanation
scores were subtracted from the pre-explanation scores to create a vote change index.
A one-way ANOVA on the likelihood to vote for Trump change index revealed a main effect of Trump
support, F2,797= 8.23; p< 0.001; MSE= 1.68; η2p = 0.02, indicating that change differed between groups.
Republican non-supporters increased their likelihood to vote for Trump significantly more (by +0.44)
than Democrats and Republican supporters (who shifted their rating by +0.05 and −0.21, respectively),
F1,797= 7.72; p= 0.006; MSE= 1.67.
Analogous to Experiment 1, pairwise correlations were calculated for all Trump support groups
to investigate whether belief change in misinformation or factual statements was associated with a
likelihood to vote for Trump. As in Experiment 1, intentions to vote for Trump were largely independent
of belief change. However, using a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level of 0.008, three correlations were
significant: Democrats were shown to (i) reduce their likelihood to vote for Trump the more they reduced
their belief in Trump-attributed misinformation (r= 0.13), as well as (ii) increase their likelihood to vote
for Trump the more they increased their belief in Trump-attributed facts (r= 0.18). Somewhat ironically,
(iii) Republican Trump supporters reduced their likelihood to vote for Trump when they increased their
belief in the Trump-attributed fact items (r=−0.24).
3.3. Discussion
Experiment 2 primarily investigated whether partisanship-congruent explanations were more effective
than partisanship-incongruent explanations, or whether an unexpected explanation source would be
more effective. Pre-explanation findings of Experiment 1 were replicated, as Republican supporters
believed in the Trump-attributed misinformation and factual information to a greater extent than both
the Republican non-supporters and Democrats.
Post-explanation, we found that the partisanship congruence of explanations did not have as
large an impact as hypothesized, and post-explanation belief was rather dictated by the group
membership of the individual (i.e. whether the participant was a Democrat, Republican non-supporter
or Republican supporter). However, Republican non-supporters were somewhat more likely to update
their misinformed beliefs if a correction was attributed to a Republican source. It is possible that a
respected explanation source is particularly helpful when the initial information is from a source that
is not respected, although this effect did not extend to true statements.
Finally, the increase in the Republican non-supporters’ post-explanation likelihood-to-vote ratings
could reflect a backfire effect—it is plausible that Republican non-supporters do not wish to be nudged
by explanations that could be perceived as liberal, thus leading them to further support the Republican
figure. However, as Experiment 2 did not have an unattributed control condition for comparison (as
Experiment 1 did), it is uncertain whether or not this shift was due to the Trump attribution of the
corrections.
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4. General discussion
The present research aimed to determine whether belief in misinformation and factual information
depended on whether or not it stemmed from a politically polarizing source, and whether it could
be successfully corrected or affirmed. To this end, we presented participants with both inaccurate and
factual statements made by Donald Trump on the campaign trail. Experiment 1 allowed us to investigate
whether people use their support in political figures as a heuristic to guide their assessment of the
veracity of this information, and Experiment 2 addressed whether partisanship-congruent explanations
were more effective than partisanship-incongruent explanations. By keeping the content of the initial
information and explanations stable across conditions, we were able to provide an accurate measure of
a source’s impact upon information processing.
4.1. Pre-explanation belief scores
We found that participants’ opinion of Donald Trump influenced their assessment of information, that
is, how valid they perceived it to be. The graded nature of information belief when it was attributed to
Trump in comparison to the unattributed condition (i.e. Democrats decreasing, Republican supporters
increasing, Republican non-supporters not affected as much) fits well with the graded intention to vote
for Donald Trump, as revealed in Experiment 1. These findings are consistent with the findings from
the literature regarding source credibility [34]. Given that attitude homophily is a crucial component
of source credibility [6], coupled with the notion that higher source credibility results in an increased
perception of information credibility [46], it is reasonable that political figures such as Donald Trump act
as a heuristic when evaluating the veracity of information.
Democrats showing lower levels of belief when information is attributed to Trump could reflect
rational updating that takes the experienced base rates into account. However, this could also be
an occasion where Democrats demonstrate equal biases to those of Republicans. While Republicans
increased belief in inaccurate information if it came from a source they regard as trustworthy, Democrats
indicated lower fact belief if the information came from a source they did not regard as trustworthy.
Some of the true items used in this study are more aligned with traditional liberal ideology (e.g. that the
USA spent $2 trillion on the war in Iraq), indicating that this effect holds even when processing factual
information that could be considered worldview-congruent. This supports Kahan’s [4] stance that biases
such as motivated cognition could occur at both ends of the political spectrum, while running counter
to the notion that people who hold right-wing ideology are more susceptible to motivated cognition
in general. Our paper therefore contributes to mounting literature that all individuals—regardless of
partisanship—are biased by their own worldview, rather than there being fundamental differences in
cognition between people with differing political values [29,30,33,47–49].
4.2. Post-explanation Trump attribution
Intriguingly, even when Trump statements were followed by credible explanations that ought to induce
sustained knowledge revision and belief updating, in all groups there was a greater level of inaccuracy
in comparison to the unattributed condition. This was particularly the case with regard to factual
statements over the long term.
Republicans and Democrats seemed to take into account their Trump-related biases and overcorrected
for them one week after the explanations: Republican supporters by assuming that Trump’s facts were
false and Democrats by assuming that Trump’s misinformation was true. There is precedent for such
meta-cognitive effects in the political information-processing literature. Overcorrection has been seen
to occur for mood-related biases when people assume their feelings are affecting their judgement and
attempt to correct for their influence [50]. For example, Isbell & Wyer [51] found that participants rated
political figures less favourably when participants were happy than when they were not, in an attempt
to adjust for what they perceived to be an irrelevant affective influence. This overcorrection for biases
appears to also influence the judgement of veracity when it comes to correcting misinformation and
affirming factual information that stems from a polarizing source.
It is important to highlight that Trump attribution has a relatively small effect size in comparison with
the common effects of the retention interval in the post-explanation analyses. The consistency in belief
updating and forgetting over time perhaps reflects that partisan effects are not as consequential as more
general cognitive consequences such as the reversion to original assumptions over time.
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4.3. Explanation source
Different explanation sources did not have as large an impact as hypothesized. It is noteworthy in itself
that the explanation source did not have as large an impact as the support of the person purporting
the initial information. While Berinsky [3] found that corrections from an unlikely source aided belief
updating, this was when the to-be-corrected information was specifically counter to the traditional
stances of a political party, for example, when Republicans debunked rumours regarding health care.
It is possible that our amalgamation of items was not sufficiently in opposition to the core values of the
Republican party to replicate these results. While it seemed that Republican non-supporters reduced
their misinformation belief most following a Republican correction, it is necessary to replicate these
results due to the post hoc nature of the analysis.
4.4. Worldview backfire effects
There was no evidence for a worldview backfire effect in either experiment, as post-explanation
misinformation belief scores remained below pre-explanation levels. In 2005, Nyhan & Reifler [23] found
a backfire effect in conservatives when trying to correct the belief that weapons of mass destruction were
found in Iraq. Yet in 2006, this effect was not replicated—the correction led conservatives to appropriately
update their belief. The authors argued that, between 2005 and 2006, conservatives came to place less
importance on the war, suggesting that backfire effects may only occur when an issue is strongly and
currently connected with an individual’s political identity. In the present case, perhaps not all four pieces
of misinformation resonated strongly enough with Republicans to create a notable backfire effect. The
present pattern—obtained using a variety of real-world items rather than relying on only one contentious
topic (as previous studies have [21–23])—suggests that worldview backfire effects are not the norm and
may only occur under very specific circumstances.
4.5. Voting preferences
While it is possible that the observed changes in voting preferences between pre- and post-explanation
are due to the presentations of the corrections and affirmations, it appears that the negative
political ramifications of disseminating misinformation are limited. Belief change in Trump-attributed
misinformation remained uncorrelated with a change in voting intentions and feelings towards Trump.
Many individuals, and indeed political scientists, did not predict the success of Donald Trump [52,53].
This study contributes one further piece of the puzzle as to why his success was sustained: spreading
misinformation did not hinder his candidacy, and even if misinformation was exposed, this did not
reduce voting preferences or positive feelings. This could reflect that, to a certain extent, people expect
politicians to make inaccurate statements [54], thus they are not overly concerned when this expectation
is met. Moreover, in the context of this study, providing an equal number of misinformation and factual
items could have both reduced and boosted candidate support. Although people’s opinions of a political
candidate should ideally not increase if they hear the candidate made a factual statement—this should be
an expectation rather than an added benefit—the equal presentation of misinformation and facts could
explain the null effect. An avenue for future research would be to vary the proportion of true and false
statements from the political figure that are provided to participants.
Understanding Donald Trump’s popularity, despite the degree of misinformation he has
distributed [41,42], is an interesting case study of American politics. However, it is uncertain to what
extent the findings of the current experiments are in fact a ‘Trump phenomenon’. While he is perhaps
a good candidate for the study of misinformation, political misinformation is common in the political
arena [1]. To test whether the present findings are generalizable beyond Donald Trump, this experiment
should be replicated with a Democratic and a different Republican political figure. Another potential
barrier to generalizability is that the participants from Experiment 1 were Mechanical Turk workers.
However, several studies have found that this population yields high-quality data, comparable to other
convenience samples such as university students [55,56], and Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1’s
data trends in a more diverse sample.
There are many possible explanations for why Americans voted for Donald Trump in the primary and
the general election: factors such as his perceived business acumen, his economic or immigration policies,
or perhaps the fact that he was not a career politician increased his appeal [57,58]. We cannot speak to
these possibilities. This study illustrates that something other than veracity accounted for his success, as
supporters did not change their voting intentions even if they altered their beliefs about the truth of his
 on April 4, 2017http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
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statements. If spreading falsehoods does not discredit character, it is perhaps not surprising that many
individuals rallied behind him on election day [59,60]. According to Ramsay et al. [44], 91% of voters said
that information in campaigns sometimes seemed misleading or false, yet struggled to pinpoint exactly
what is fact and what is fiction. The real-world consequences of this study suggest that politicians can
seemingly spread misinformation without dramatic negative consequences of losing supporters—the
results of the 2016 Presidential election are consistent with this interpretation. It thus appears that it
is possible to appeal through the art of rhetoric and demagoguery rather than necessitating cohesive
arguments constructed of logic and fact.
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Appendix A
See table 2.
Appendix B
If the post-explanation items are analysed separately, we see similar trends as to the accuracy score
analyses. For the fact items we likewise see the main effects of source, F1,1538= 19.79; p< 0.001;
MSE= 2.38; η2p = 0.01, retention interval, F1,1538= 190.48; p< 0.001; MSE= 2.38; η2p = 0.11, and an
interaction of source and retention interval, F1,1538= 9.00; p= 0.003; MSE= 2.38; η2p = 0.006. In addition,
there is a Trump support and source interaction, F2,1538= 3.28; p= 0.038; MSE= 2.38; η2p = 0.004,
indicating that Trump support influences the degree to which the Trump attribution influences belief.
A planned comparison indicates that Democrats do not update their belief in the factual items to the
same extent as the Republican groups if the information is attributed to Trump, F1,1538= 5.12; p= 0.024;
MSE= 2.37. There is also an interaction of Trump support and retention interval, F2,1538= 3.44; p= 0.032;
MSE= 2.38; η2p = 0.004. While Democrats over both time periods are worse at updating their belief in the
facts if information is attributed to Trump, Republicans immediately update their belief equally in the
Trump and unattributed conditions, yet after one week belief in the Trump information reduces below
that in the unattributed condition, F1,1538= 5.08; p= 0.024; MSE= 2.38.
The post-explanation misinformation items reveal three main effects. A marginal main effect of source,
F1,1538= 3.78; p= 0.052; MSE= 3.20; η2p = 0.002, indicating that the Trump attribution led to less accurate
belief, and a main effect of Trump support, F2,1538= 33.35; p< 0.001; MSE= 3.20; η2p = 0.04, indicating
that Republican supporters had higher belief in the misinformation than Democrats and Republican
supporters, F1,1538= 53.00; p< 0.001. Finally, a main effect of retention interval, F2,1538= 64.50; p< 0.001;
MSE= 3.20; η2p = 0.04 indicating belief increased over time, all groups forgetting that the misinformation
was in fact false. There was no interaction of source and retention interval, indicating that unlike the
fact scores (where Trump attribution led to less accurate beliefs particularly over time), the information
associated with Trump is considered to be less accurate over both time periods.
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Figure 11. Feelings-thermometer scores over time across partisanship and sources. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
Appendix C
The feelings thermometer scores can be seen in figure 11. A 2× 2× 3 factorial ANOVA on the feelings-
change index revealed an interaction of retention interval and Trump support, F2,11530= 21.67; p< 0.001;
MSE= 139.37; η2p = 0.03, indicating that Republican non-supporters and Republican supporters changed
their feelings towards Trump more than Democrats. Mimicking voting preferences, over the course of a
week Republican supporters indicated feeling ‘cooler’ towards Trump, and Republican non-supporters
indicated feeling ‘warmer’.
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